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Abstract 
 
This study investigates persistence of global terrorism in a panel of 163 countries for the 
period 2010 to 2015. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments. 
The following findings are established. First, persistence in terrorism is a decreasing function 
of income levels because it consistently increases from high income (through upper middle 
income) to lower middle income countries. Second, compared to Christian-oriented countries, 
terrorism is more persistent in Islam-oriented nations. Third, landlocked countries also reflect 
a higher level of persistence relative to their coastal counterparts. Fourth, Latin American 
countries show higher degrees of persistence when compared with Middle East and North 
African (MENA) countries. Fifth, the main determinants of the underlying persistence are 
political instability and weapons import. The results are discussed to provide answers to four 
main questions which directly pertain to the reported findings. These questions centre on why 
comparative persistence in terrorism is based on income levels, religious orientation, 
landlockedness and regions.  
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1. Introduction 
This study is motivated by three main factors in policy and scholarly literature, notably: 
growing evidence of terrorism; the policy imperative of understanding dynamics in the 
persistence of terrorism and gaps in the attendant literature. These three factors are 
substantiated in chronological order.  
 First, in the light of the 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014), terrorism has been 
rising in scope and scale across the globe. Such a rise has been facilitated by negative 
externalities from the 2011 Arab Spring. Some stylized facts are worth highlighting to 
substantiate the perspective (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). Libya has become a failed State 
in the post-Gaddafi era because there are many rebel groups vying to: (i) determine the law of 
the land and (ii) take decisions that will steer the country to a new development course. The 
situation in Yemen has deteriorated owing to a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran who 
are supporting opposing factions of the war. The Boko Haram of Nigeria has been extending 
its activities to neighboring countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The war in Syria has 
led to fragile political situations in neighboring countries like Lebanon and Iraq on the one 
hand and on the other, the birth of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The 
ramifications of ISIL have had far-reaching consequences, notably, the: December 2014  
Sydney-Australian hostage crisis; failed Australian attack in February 2015; foiled January 
2015 Vervier attacks in  Belgium and the 2015 “Charlie Hebdo” attacks  in Paris-France.  
 Second, the policy relevance of the study can be articulated along three strands, 
namely, the: consequences of terrorism; cost of terrorism and imperative to understand 
persistence in terrorism. In what follows, the strands are substantiated in the same chronology. 
(i) Terrorism and conflicts have been substantially affecting development outcomes, notably: 
activities of sabotage by  the  Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta in Nigeria’s 
oil  Delta region (Onuoba, 2010; Obi, 2010; Akpan, Essien,  & Isihak, 2013; Taylor, 2014); 
considerable disruptions in Libyan petroleum production after the fall of Colonel Gaddafi 
(Gaub, 2014); the In Amenas Al-Qaeda attacks in Algeria (Onyeji, Brazilian, & Bronk, 2014) 
and ISIL’s control of many petroleum installations in Syria  (Celso, 2015; Le Billon, 2015). 
(ii) The global cost of fighting terrorism has been steadily rising. According to the 2015 
Global Peace Index (GPI) report, approximately thirteen percent of the global Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) is spent on preventing, fighting and mitigating conflicts and terrorism 
(Anderson, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017). According to the authors, this represents 
the combined annual GDP of the following countries: Brazil, Canada, France, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, and Germany.  The wealth could alternatively be spent on other 
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development outcomes like the funding to socio-economic projects in the light of challenging 
sustainable development goals. 
(iii) The policy relevance of understanding persistence in terrorism also builds on the fact that 
understanding persistence in terrorism is relevant in potentially mitigating drivers of such 
persistence. A possible externality could be less income being spent on fighting terrorism and 
hopefully more financial resources allocated for other socio-economic investments.  
Third, the scholarly importance of this paper is motivated by the scarce literature on 
persistence in terrorism. As summarized in Table 1, as far as we have reviewed, we still know 
very little about persistence in terrorism at a global scale because no such study is apparent in 
the extant literature. The study closest to this paper is Asongu and Nwachukwu (2018) which 
has assessed timelines for policy harmonization against terrorism in a sample of 78 
developing countries for the period 1984-2008. This paper steers clear of the underlying study 
because it addresses a different problem statement and focuses on 163 countries for the period 
2010-2015. Moreover, in order to improve space for policy implications, the empirical 
analysis articulates some fundamental characteristics of comparative economic development. 
Hence, the rich dataset is decomposed into: income levels, legal origins, religious domination, 
regional proximity and landlockedness1.  
The following findings are established. First, persistence in terrorism is a decreasing 
function of income levels because it consistently increases from high income (through upper 
middle income) to lower middle income countries. Second, compared to Christian-oriented 
countries, terrorism is more persistent in Islam-oriented nations. Third, landlocked countries 
also reflect a higher level of persistence relative to their coastal counterparts. Fourth, Latin 
American countries show higher degrees of persistence when compared with Middle East and 
North African (MENA) countries. Fifth, the main determinants of the underlying persistence 
are political instability and weapons import. The results  are discussed to provide answers to 
four main questions which directly pertain to the reported findings, notably: (i) Why does 
persistence in terrorism decrease as income levels increase, (ii) Why is persistence in 
terrorism more apparent in Islam-oriented countries compared to Christian-oriented 
countries, (iii) Why do Landlocked countries reflect higher levels of persistence in terrorism 
                                                          
1
 Another stream of studies has used the same methodology and dataset but focused on different problem 
statements.  This includes studies focusing on: the persistence of incarcerations (Asongu, 2019); contemporary 
drivers of global tourism (Asongu, Nnanna, Biekpe & Acha-Anyi, 2019a) and the murder or homicide epidemic 
(Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2019). This study departs from the attendant studies by focusing on global terrorism.  
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relative to coastal countries and (iv) Why is persistence in terrorism more in Latin American 
countries compared  to the MENA countries?  
Global terrorism within the context of the study provides a holistic summary of 
principal global patterns and tendencies of terrorism (GTI, 2014). It discloses a composite 
measurement that ranks countries systematically in terms of activities of terrorism, which 
entail a number of characteristics linked with attacks of terrorism. In the global terrorism 
index (GTI), terrorism is defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence 
by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, 
coercion, or intimidation”. This definition acknowledges that terrorism is not exclusively an 
attack of physical nature but also encompasses long-term psychological impacts on society. 
According to the narrative, in order for a terrorism incidence to be incorporated into the GTI, 
it has to be consistent with an international act of threat violence or violence by actors that 
have non-state status. Moreover, an incident has to fulfill three fundamental criteria in order 
for it to be considered as an act of terrorism, notably: (i) the occurrence should be incidental 
or the outcome of a conscious act from the perpetrator; (ii) the incidence must encompass 
some threat of violence or degree of violence which entails violence against people and (iii) 
the dataset does not include incidences of state terrorism because only acts from sub-national 
actors are taken on board.  
The above conceptual clarification of terrorism is also because there is no consensus 
on the definition of terrorism in the literature. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
The theoretical underpinnings and related literature are covered in Section 2. Section 3 
presents the data and methodology while the empirical results and corresponding discussion 
are disclosed in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5 with implications and future research 
directions.  
 
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings and literature review 
2.1 Theoretical underpinnings  
The theoretical background underpinning this study is consistent with recent literature on 
persistence in financial (Stephan & Tsapin, 2008; Goddard, Liu, Molyneux, & Wilson, 2011) 
and inclusive (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a) development.  Moreover, the theoretical 
perspective is founded on studies which have investigated cross-country convergence in 
income levels within the framework of neoclassical growth models (Baumol, 1986; Barro, 
1991; Barro  &  Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995;  Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992). We build on the 
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theoretical underpinnings because they have been extended to other fields of economic 
development, notably: inclusive development (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; Asongu, 2014), 
financial market progress (Narayan, Mishra, & Narayan, 2011; Bruno, De Bonis, & 
Silvestrini, 2012; Asongu, 2013) and terrorism (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018) studies.    
 It is important to note that the underlying theoretical background falls within the 
framework of nascent economic growth theories that were developed in the post-Keynesian 
époque. Such theoretical perspective gained prominence owing to substantial changes in the 
neoclassical revolution that diminished cross-country differences in income levels. Within the 
neoclassical framework, notions of market equilibrium were advanced to articulate the 
relevance of economic growth theories in decreasing differences in per capita income across 
nations. As emphasized by Mayer-Foulkes (2010), such convergence tendencies are 
substantially traceable to favorable externalities of “free market competition”. Two principal 
scholarly strands are apparent in the literature. The first argues that the lack of convergence 
(or evidence of divergence) in income levels across countries is feasible because of a plethora 
of reasons, notably: differences in initial endowments and multiple equilibria (Barro, 1991; 
Pritchett, 1997). Conversely, a second strand in theoretical literature maintains the position 
that, despite heterogeneities in initial conditions, decreasing cross-country differences in 
income levels is feasible, essentially because countries can converge to a long-term 
equilibrium or country-specific steady state (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a).   
 In the light of the above contending strands, the objective of this study is not to take 
sides in any school of thought. In essence, our purpose is to build on the common criteria 
employed by both strands in the literature to accept or reject evidence of convergence.  
According to this criterion, persistence can be established depending on whether the lagged 
estimated outcome variable falls within the convergence interval. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
It is relevant to first provide some insights into “four waves of terrorism” from a thesis 
by Rapoport (2001) before discussing the attendant literature.  According to the narrative, 
there are four fundamental waves of terror. The first or anarchist wave is consistent with the 
position that the history of contemporary terrorism started with a “first wave” in the late 19th 
century in Central and Eastern Europe. During this period of time, Europe and the United 
States witnessed extensive periods of transformation and development.  
The second or “Nationalist-Separatist” wave took place between the 1920s and 1960s. 
A principal feature in this wave is the progress of movements of separatist and nationalist 
7 
 
character. These movements were against a longstanding domination of European countries 
which during the 1700s expanded rapidly by acquiring territories in many parts of the world. 
Such acquisitions were largely no longer welcomed because imperialism and colonization 
were fought from a multiple of fronts.   
The third or revolutionary wave is characterized by the success of guerrilla movements 
in the war between the United States and Vietnam during the 1970s. During this era, 
revolutionary movements understood the success of the Vietcong as a measure of hope in the 
perspective that a revolution of popular nature could be successful against Western opponents.   
The fourth or religious wave is characterized by violence that is made in the name of 
religion. Many examples are used to substantiate this fourth wave, notably: politically-
motivated wars that are tailored to defend religious faith.  Terror activities are used as the 
principal means by which to meet political objectives.  
Table 1 which is consistent with Asongu, Orim and Nting  (2019b), summarizes some 
extant literature on factors driving or deterring terrorism across the world. The corresponding 
literature can be discussed in four main strands which articulate: (i) foreign aid and policy, (ii) 
“democracy, civil liberties and state failure”, (iii) welfare and (iv) “foreign occupation and 
military expenditure”.  
First, on the connection between foreign/policy and terrorism, Savun and Phillips 
(2009) have investigated why democracies are particularly vulnerable to transnational 
terrorism to conclude that the relationship is contingent on a country’s behavior. They posit 
that, irrespective of the type of political regime in place (democracy versus autocracy), unlike 
regimes that pursue isolationist foreign policy, regimes that are more involved in international 
politics are also more likely to be targeted by transitional terrorism. Choi and Salehyan (2014) 
have assessed linkages between refugees, humanitarian aid and terrorism to establish that “no 
good deed goes unpunished” because the infusion of aid resources provides looting avenues 
for militant groups and by extension, opportunities for attacking foreign interests.  Button 
(2014) has used the mechanism of “interstate rivalry” to elucidate why aid-for-
counterterrorism may work in some contexts and not in others. The authors argue that if 
recipients receiving US aid are involved in interstate rivalry, these recipients are more likely 
to use the aid in arming themselves against their rivals instead of using it to fight terrorism. 
Moreover, these recipients can further play-up the terrorism threat in order to receive more 
aid. 
Button and Carter (2014) have shown that the nexus between foreign aid and 
transnational terrorism is contingent on whether terrorist activity in the recipient country 
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threatens the United States directly or not. Hence, the United States is more likely to offer aid 
to countries in which terrorist activities target her interests. Eng and Urperlainen (2015) build 
on the premises that: (i) groups with domestic interests in the donor country have the potential 
for mobilizing support for the implementation of rewards and punishments by donors and (ii) 
the expectation of the underlying mobilization affects the credibility of promises and threats at 
the initial contracting stages. The main purpose is to assess how domestic interest groups 
affect the ability of a donor to credibly commit to implementing promises and threats. The 
authors find that: (i) for the purpose of credibility, donors for the most part, often promise 
very generous rewards or warn on very severe sanctions that are largely out of proportion and 
(ii) donors are unable to simultaneously make promises and credible threats unless both 
instruments are supported by domestic interest groups. Asongu and Ssozi (2017) have 
concluded that foreign aid (bilateral, multilateral and total) is effective at mitigating terrorism 
exclusively in countries where initial levels of transnational terrorism are highest. 
In the second strand which focuses on democracy, civil liberties and state failure, Lee 
(2013) investigate the connection between democracy, civil liberties and hostage-taking 
terrorism in order to understand types of governments that are more prone to terrorism. The 
article builds on the argument that hostage-taking terrorism may be more apparent in 
democratic governments because democracies attribute a lot of value to personal freedom and 
human value. The empirical evidence supports this argument. Gries, Meierrieks and Redlin 
(2015) investigate the relationship between economic and military aid from the United States, 
conditions of human rights and the rise in aid-receiving countries of anti-American 
transnational terrorism. The authors find that a combination of military/economic dependence 
on the United States and local repression generates anti-American terrorism. In summary, no 
evidence is found to support the perspective that foreign assistance by the United States 
makes the United States safer.  Coggins (2015) investigates whether state failure causes 
terrorism to find that, for the most part, failed and failing states are not predisposed to higher 
prevalence of terrorism. However, states experiencing political collapse or at war are found to 
be significantly more associated with the experience and production of terror.  
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Table 1: Drivers and Deterrents of Terrorism  
Author(s) Period Sample Methodology Terrorism 
Dynamics 
Instruments  Effects on 
terrorism  
       
Tavares (2004) 1987–
2001 
2725 observations 
and 1428 attacks 
OLS Domestic and 
transnational 
Terrorism 
Democracy  The instrument 
reduces terrorism 
       
Testas (2004) 1968–
1991 
37 Muslim 
countries 
 
Poisson Regression 
Model 
Transnational 
terrorism 
University enrollment The instrument 
increases 
terrorism 
       
Bravo and Dias 
(2006) 
1997–
2004 
60–85 Countries 
 
OLS Domestic and 
transnational 
terrorism 
Adult population 
literacy rate 
The instrument 
reduces terrorism 
       
Drakos and Gofas 
(2006) 
1985–
1998 
139 Countries 
 
Negative Binomial and 
Zero-inflated Negative 
Binomial Regressions 
Transnational 
terrorism 
Trade openness and 
Polity  
The instruments 
reduces terrorism 
       
Kurrild-Klitgaard, 
Justesen, and 
Klemmensen 
(2006) 
1996–
2002 
97–121 Countries binary logistical 
regression 
Transnational 
terrorism 
political rights and 
civil liberties 
The instruments 
reduces terrorism 
       
Azam and Thelen 
(2008) 
1990–
2004 
176 Countries 
 
negative binomial 
model 
Transnational 
terrorism 
Secondary school 
enrolment  
The instrument 
reduces terrorism 
       
Savun and Phillips 
(2009) 
1968-
2001 
and  
1998-
2004 
163 Countries Zero-Inflated Negative 
Binomial Regression 
Domestic and 
Transnational 
Terrorism  
Democracy and 
foreign policy 
behaviour  
Isolationist 
foreign policy and 
less democracy 
breed less 
terrorism 
       
Krieger and 
Meierrieks (2010) 
 
1980-
2003 
15 Western 
European 
countries  
negative binomial 
count model  
Home-grown 
terrorism 
Social spending  Higher spending 
in some field 
reduces terror 
       
Kavanagh (2011) 1992–
1996 
Lebanon Logit model  Domestic 
terror 
(Hezbollah 
militants) 
The role of education 
and poverty in 
terrorism 
participation  
poverty increases 
terrorism 
participation for 
individuals with 
high education 
       
Bhavnani (2011) 2006-
2008 
Israel and two 
rival Palestinian 
factions 
Logistic regression Transnational 
terrorism 
Selective violence 
based on political 
control  
Selective violence 
based on Israeli 
control 
       
Azam and Thelen 
(2010) 
1990–
2004 
132 Countries 
 
negative binomial 
model 
Transnational 
terrorism 
Secondary school 
enrolment  
The instrument 
reduces terrorism 
       
Cho (2010) 1984-
2004 
131 countries  negative binomial 
maximum likelihood 
regression, averaged 
negative binomial 
regression and rare 
event logit models 
Domestic and 
international 
terrorism  
Democratic rule of 
law  
The instrument 
reduce terrorism 
       
Lee (2013) 1978-
2005 
Hostage events the multilevel Poisson 
model 
Hostage-taking 
terrorism  
Democratic values 
(Civil liberties and 
press freedom) 
Democratic values 
motivate terrorism 
       
Choi and Salehyan 
(2014) 
1970-
2007 
154 Countries  negative binomial 
regression and tobit 
model 
Domestic and 
transnational 
terrorism 
Infusion of aid 
resources  
Countries with 
more refugees 
experience more 
terrorism 
       
Hoffman, Shelton, 
and Cleven (2013) 
1975-
1995 
Undisclosed. Use 
of annual costs of 
attacks 
ZINB (zero-inflated 
negative binomial) 
regression models 
Transnational 
terrorism  
Press freedom and 
publicity  
Demand for press 
attention fuels 
terrorism  
       
Bell, Clay, Murdie 
and  Piazza (2014) 
1970-
2006 
144 countries  Negative Binomial 
Regression 
Domestic and 
transnational 
terrorism  
Lack of transparency 
(internal & external) 
Internal & 
external 
transparency  
increases 
domestic and 
transnational  
terrorism 
       
 
 
Asongu and 
Nwachukwu 
(2018) 
 
 
1984-
2008 
 
 
78 developing 
countries  
 
 
System GMM 
(Roodman) 
 
 
Domestic & 
Transnational  
 
 
Catch-up for policy 
harmonization  
13.34-19.92 years 
for domestic 
terrorism and 
24.67-27.88 years 
for transnational 
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terrorism 
       
Asongu and Ssozi 
(2017) 
 
1984-
2008 
 
78 developing 
countries  
 
Quantile regressions  
domestic, 
transnational, 
unclear and 
total terrorism 
dynamics 
Bilateral, Multilateral 
and Total aid 
Aid is effective in 
the highest 
quantile of 
transnational 
terrorism  
       
Brockhoff, Kieger 
and Meierrieks 
(2015) 
1984-
2007 
133 countries Two-step cluster 
analysis 
Domestic 
terrorism  
Education Education 
decreases 
terrorism 
especially when 
socio-economic 
conditions are 
better 
       
Coggins (2015) 1999-
2008 
155 countries  GEE1 Negative 
Binomial 
Location, 
perpetrator, 
domestic, 
domestic-
perpetrator, 
international-
location and 
international-
perpetrator 
terrorisms.  
Stages of failed states  Avoidance of 
failed states in 
war or political 
collapse  
       
Button and Carter 
(2014) 
1970-
2007 
USA and USA 
allies  
Non-contemporary 
regressions  
Global and 
transnational 
terrorisms 
USA foreign aid Effective when 
USA interest are 
threatened 
Button (2014) 1968-
2008 
Recipients of 
USA foreign aid 
duration and count 
models 
International 
terrorism  
USA foreign aid Effective when 
recipient state do 
not have 
conflicting 
priorities 
       
Collard-Wexler 
Pischedda and 
Smith (2014) 
 
1980-
2008 
74 foreign state 
occupations  
Naïve and Hardening 
mechanisms models 
based on Pape’s theory 
of occupation 
Suicide attacks 
in countries 
experiencing 
foreign 
military 
occupation 
Avoidance of foreign 
military interventions 
to mitigate suicide 
attacks in countries 
experiencing military 
interventions. 
Foreign 
occupations 
increases suicide 
attacks  
       
Enders, Hoover, 
and Sandler 
(2014) 
1970-
2010 
Undisclosed  Terrorism Lorenz 
curve and nonlinear 
smooth transition 
regressions 
Domestic and 
transitional 
terrorism  
Real GDP per capita  Terrorism more 
concentrated in 
middle-income 
countries  
       
Choi and Piazza 
(2017) 
1981-
2005 
138 Countries  negative binomial 
maximum-likelihood 
regression model  
Suicide attacks 
in countries 
experiencing 
military 
interventions  
Avoidance of foreign 
military interventions 
to mitigate suicide 
attacks in countries 
experiencing military 
interventions. 
Certain features of 
pro-government 
intervention 
increase suicide 
attacks in 
countries 
experience 
military 
interventions  
       
Gries et al. (2015) 1984-
2008 
126 countries  Negative Binomial 
Regression and 
System GMM 
Anti-USA 
terrorism  
USA aid dependence  USA aid-
dependence fuels  
Anti-USA 
terrorism  
       
GMM: Generalised Method of Moments.  
Source: Author 
 
The third strand discusses studies which have focused on the relationship between 
welfare and terrorism. Krieger and Meierrieks (2010) examine terrorism in the world of 
welfare capitalism. They investigate the influence of social measures on home-grown 
terrorism  to establish that whereas social spending in some sectors (e.g. public housing) has 
no impact, social spending in some other fields (e.g. active labor market programs, 
unemployment and health benefits) are linked to a decrease in home-grown terrorism. Enders 
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et al. (2014) have assessed the changing nonlinear nexus between terrorism and income levels 
to establish that transnational and domestic attacks are more apparent in middle income 
countries. The findings of Kavanagh (2011) show that, poverty increases the probability of 
becoming a Hezbollah militant exclusively in individuals with at least high school level of 
education.  
 The fourth strand deals with studies that have focused on linkages between foreign 
occupation, military inventions and terrorism. Collard-Wexler et al. (2014) investigate 
whether foreign occupations cause suicide attacks to establish that foreign occupations are 
associated with a significant and consistent impact on the occurrence of suicide attacks. Choi 
and Piazza (2017) investigate whether military intervention affects suicide attacks to conclude 
that exceptionally, foreign interventions with specific characteristics (such as pro-government 
interventions encompassing a larger number of ground troops) increase suicide attacks in 
countries where such military interventions are deployed. Asongu and Amankwah-Amoah 
(2017) investigate whether military expenditure can be used to dampen the effect of terrorism 
on capital fight. Contingent on terrorist targets, the authors show that a threshold of between 
4.224 and 7.363 of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is needed to crowd-out the 
negative impact of terrorism on capital flight.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
This study examines a panel of 163 countries for the period 2010 to 2015.  As summarised in 
Appendix 1, the data is from a plethora of sources, namely, the:  United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends; Institute for Economics and Peace 
(IEP); Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; United Nations Committee on Contributions; and a 
Qualitative assessment by the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) analysts’ estimates. The 
selection of the periodicity and number of countries are respectively motivated by the 
imperative to obtain findings with more updated policy implications and data availability 
constraints.  
 The main outcome variable is the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) overall score. In order 
to prevent mathematical concerns related to the log-transformation of zeros and correction of 
the positive skew in our data distribution, the study takes the natural logarithm of  GTI scores 
by adding one to the base number. This conversion approach is consistent with recent 
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literature (Choi & Salehyan, 2013; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, & Younas, 2014; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017b). 
 The independent variable of interest is the lagged dependent variable whereas control 
variables include: security officers & police; political instability; weapons imports; weapons 
export; displaced persons; military expenditure and the United Nations Peace Keeping Force 
(UNPKF). These indicators in the conditioning information set have been substantially 
documented in the terrorism and conflicts literature (Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., 2006; Lee, 2013; 
Bell et al., 2014; Choi & Salehyan, 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b). 
 Consistent with the motivation of the study on the need to increase room for policy 
implications, we decompose the rich dataset into fundamental characteristics based on:  (i) 
regions (Latin America; North America; South Asia; Europe & Central Asia; East Asia & the 
Pacific; sub-Saharan Africa (SSA);  Middle East & North Africa (MENA)); (ii) openness to 
sea (Landlocked and  Coastal); (iii)  religious orientation (Christian with Catholic domination; 
Buddhist-oriented countries;  Christian with Protestant inclination; Islam-oriented countries 
and Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from Catholicism and 
Protestantism is dominant); and (iv) legal origins (Scandinavian civil law countries, French 
civil law, German civil law countries, English common law, and  Socialists countries). The 
adopted fundamental characteristics have been used in a great bulk of comparative 
development literature (D’Amico, 2010; Narayan et al., 2011; Beegle, Christiaensen, 
Dabalen, &  Gaddis, 2016;  Mlachila, Tapsoba, & Tapsoba, 2017; Asongu & le Roux, 2017). 
The information criteria underpinning the choice of the fundamental features are discussed in 
what follows.  
 The basis for legal origins is La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008, p. 289). 
The World Fact Book (CIA, 2011) of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is used for the 
categorization of dominant religions while income level classification is consistent with the 
World Bank’s categorization2. Coastal countries can be directly observed from a world map. 
The definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1 whereas Appendix 2 discloses the 
summary statistics and sampled countries in Panel A and Panel B respectively. The 
correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 3. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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3.2 Methodology  
Consistent with recent literature on the persistence of macroeconomic indicators, we employ 
the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) as the estimation technique (Asongu &  
Nwachukwu, 2017a; Doyle, 2017).  There are four main justifications to the choice of this 
strategy. First, given that the number of countries is substantially higher than the number of 
periods, the N(163)>T(6) condition needed for the application of the empirical strategy is met. 
Second, cross-country differences are accounted-for in the estimation approach given that it is 
panel-oriented. Third, inherent biases in the difference estimators are corrected with the 
system estimator. Fourth, the technique accounts for endogeneity by employing instruments to 
address the concern of simultaneity. Furthermore, the control for time invariant indicators also 
enhances the control for endogeneity because it accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity.  
 As opposed to traditional GMM estimation approaches, we prefer the Roodman 
(2009a, 2009b) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) because the empirical strategy has 
been documented to have more control for cross sectional dependence and restrict over-
identification or limit instrument proliferation (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; 
Boateng, Asongu, Akamavi & Tchamyou, 2018; Agoba, Abor, Osei, & Sa-Aadu, 2019; 
Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Fosu & Abass, 2019). 
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiT ,
 
is an indicator of terrorism or Global Terrorism Index score  in country i
 
at  
period t , 0  is a constant, 
 
X  is the vector of control variables (security officers & police; 
political instability; weapons import; weapons export; displaced persons; military expenditure 
and the United Nations Peace Keeping Force (UNPKF)),
 

 
represents the coefficient of auto-
regression which is one for the specification; t
 
is the time-specific constant;
 
i
 
is the 
country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 Consistent with recent literature, we allocate space to emphasize the process of 
exclusion restrictions which is important for a consistent and robust GMM specification. With 
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regards to exclusions, we consider all explanatory variables as predetermined or suspected 
endogenous and acknowledge only time invariant omitted variables to exhibit strict 
exogeneity. Such an identification strategy is consistent with recent literature (Boateng et al., 
2018; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Tchamyou, Erreygers, & Cassimon, 2019). Furthermore, 
this process of identification is supported by Roodman (2009b) in the perspective that, it is 
not feasible for time invariant indicators to be endogenous upon first difference3.  
 From the perspective of exclusion restrictions, in the light of the process of 
identification, terrorism is affected by the strictly exogenous variables exclusively through the 
proposed mechanisms or endogenous explaining indicators. Hence, for the exclusion 
restriction assumption to hold, the null hypothesis corresponding to the Difference in Hansen 
Test (DHT) should not be rejected. This null hypothesis is the position that the time invariant 
indicators are strictly exogenous because they affect the outcome variable exclusively via the 
endogenous explaining variables.  
 Cognizant of the above insights, in the results that are reported in the section that 
follows, the hypothesis of exclusion restriction holds exclusively  if the DHT associated with 
the time invariant instrumental variables (IV) (i.e. years, eq(diff)) is not rejected. Accordingly, 
this criterion is not dissimilar to the standard IV approach for exclusion restriction which 
requires that the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test is not 
rejected, in order for the instrumental variables to account for the variations in the outcome 
variable exclusively through suggested channels (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine,  2003). 
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
Tables 2-3 present the results. While Table 2 shows findings articulating income levels, 
landlockedness and religious domination, Table 3 discloses results reflecting legal origins and 
regional proximity. The last column of both tables depicts the findings of the full sample. 
Four principal information criteria are employed to examine the validity of the GMM 
models4. In the light of these criteria, one model is not valid because of presence of 
                                                          
3
 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for 
predetermined variables. 
4
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
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autocorrelation in the residuals (see third column of Table 3) while other models are not valid 
owing to limited degrees of freedom and by extension, post-estimation instrument 
proliferation (see eighth and tenth columns of Table 2). Apart from these few exceptions, the 
models are overwhelmingly valid.  
 The validity of models is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for persistence to 
be established. The complementary condition for the establishment of persistence is that the 
estimated lagged dependent variable should be significant on the one hand and on the other, it 
should be within an interval of zero and one. This information criterion and interval is 
consistent with recent convergence literature (Fung, 2009, p. 58; Prochniak & Witkowski, 
2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b, p. 459; 
Asongu, 2013, p. 192). 
 It is important to clarify the comparative dimension of the criterion before discussing 
the findings in detail. When two or more estimated lagged coefficients are being compared, 
the sub-sample corresponding to the estimated value with a greater magnitude (in the 
estimated lagged coefficient) reflects more persistence in terrorism. The relevance of the 
magnitude builds on the perspective that a higher magnitude implies that past values of 
terrorism have a more proportionate impact on future values of terrorism.   
 The following findings can be established from Tables 1-2. First, persistence in 
terrorism is a decreasing function of income levels because it consistently increases from high 
income, upper middle income to lower middle income countries. Second, compared to 
Christian-oriented countries, terrorism is more persistent in Islam-oriented nations. Third, 
landlocked countries also reflect a higher level of persistence relative to their coastal 
counterparts. Fourth, Latin American countries show higher degrees of persistence when 
compared with MENA countries. Fifth, the main determinants of the underlying persistence 
are political instability and weapons import.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments isalso employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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Table 2: Persistence in Global terrorism with income levels, religious domination and landlockedness  
             
 Dependent Variable: Global terrorism  (GTI) 
             
 Income Levels Religious Domination Openness to sea Full 
 HI UMI LMI LI CC CP CO Islam Bhu LL NLL Sample 
Constant  -0.060 -0.116 -0.091 -0.193 0.015 0.227 0.086 -0.081 0.764 -0.089 -0.143 -0.032 
 (0.733) (0.215) (0.195) (0.325) (0.915) (0.288) (0.935) (0.587) (0.601) (0.500) (0.187) (0.745) 
Global terrorism   (-1) 0.822*** 0.950*** 0.973*** 1.042*** 0.888*** 0.577*** 0.967*** 0.949*** 1.583 0.973**
* 
0.956**
* 
0.901*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.604) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
-0.006 0.006 0.038 -0.004 -0.028 -0.117 -0.110 0.014 0.237 -0.044 0.035 0.037 
 (0.848) (0.781) (0.177) (0.906) (0.504) (0.163) (0.524) (0.582) (0.659) (0.227) (0.292) (0.309) 
Political Instability  -0.035 0.099*** 0.086*** 0.011 0.013 0.033 0.741** 0.076** 0.414 0.082**
* 
0.038 0.071** 
 (0.236) (0.000) (0.001) (0.658) (0.747) (0.617) (0.037) (0.019) (0.652) (0.004) (0.459) (0.040) 
Weapons Imports  -0.018 0.009 -0.054 -0.011 -0.011 0.188** 0.876* -0.054 -0.501 0.043 -0.020 -0.038 
 (0.212) (0.763) (0.256) (0.927) (0.707) (0.015) (0.094) (0.123) (0.489) (0.568) (0.427) (0.259) 
Weapons Exports   -0.037*** 0.022** -0.012 0.037** -0.004 -0.036* 0.110 -0.051** -0.400 -
0.046**
* 
0.009 -0.020 
 (0.007) (0.024) (0.339) (0.027) (0.728) (0.054) (0.227) (0.016) (0.613) (0.006) (0.422) (0.129) 
Displaced Persons    0.163* -
0.138*** 
-
0.058*** 
-0.008 0.003 0.111 0.603 0.044 -0.082 -
0.112**
* 
0.016 0.031 
 (0.076) (0.000) (0.002) (0.501) (0.941) (0.222) (0.243) (0.299) (0.830) (0.000) (0.670) (0.485) 
Military Expenditure   0.160*** 0.011 -0.0008 0.028 0.043 -0.045 -2.495 -0.031 -0.408 0.033 -0.015 -0.032 
 (0.001) (0.418) (0.968) (0.348) (0.358) (0.515) (0.126) (0.224) (0.795) (0.231) (0.727) (0.403) 
UNPKF  0.002 -0.016 -0.018 0.047*** 0.018 0.013 0.112 0.004 0.181 0.013 0.014 -0.0002 
 (0.927) (0.132) (0.230) (0.001) (0.245) (0.647) (0.426) (0.857) (0.641) (0.586) (0.385) (0.991) 
             
AR(1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.016) (0.001) (0.031) (0.180) (0.001) (0.545) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.177) (0.560) (0.627) (0.267) (0.851) (0.051) (0.255) (0.258) (0.513) (0.177) (0.200) (0.115) 
Sargan OIR (0.043) (0.136) (0.868) (0.539) (0.681) (0.107) (0.409) (0.398) (0.230) (0.406) (0.074) (0.327) 
Hansen OIR (0.484) (0.361) (0.343) (0.657) (0.611) (0.991) (1.000) (0.560) (1.000) (0.700) (0.189) (0.371) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
            
H excluding group (0.866) (0.109) (0.185) (0.346) (0.800) (0.653) (1.000) (0.668) (1.000) (0.495) (0.152) (0.965) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.242) (0.681) (0.524) (0.755) (0.400) (0.997) (1.000) (0.421) (1.000) (0.701) (0.324) (0.117) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) 
H excluding group 
(0.303) (0.277) (0.435) (0.667) (0.570) (0.926) (1.000) (0.658) (1.000) (0.652) (0.172) (0.664) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.901) (0.612) (0.217) (0.420) (0.519) (1.000) (1.000) (0.257) (1.000) (0.567) (0.390) (0.072) 
Fisher 324.9*** 10041**
* 
401.1*** 1341*** 441.34**
* 
885.46**
* 
49.96*** 0.949*** 19.07*** 12055**
* 
80.23**
* 
52.44*** 
Instruments 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Countries  43 36 46 38 54 26 14 49 13 34 129 163 
Observations  215 180 229 190 269 130 70 245 65 169 645 814 
             
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. HI: 
High Income countries. UMI: Upper Middle Income countries. LMI: Little Middle Income countries. LI: Low Income countries. CC: Christian countries with 
Catholic domination. CP: Christian countries with Protestant domination. CO: Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from Catholicism and 
Protestantism is dominant. Islam: Islam-oriented countries.  Bhu: Bhuddism dominated countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not Landlocked countries.  
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Table 3: Persistence in Global terrorism with regions and legal origin dynamics  
              
 Dependent variable: Global terrorism  (GTI) 
 Regions Legal origins Full 
 SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LA NA Eng. Frch. Ger. Scand. Social. Sample 
Constant  na 0.691* 0.373   -0.042 -0.079 1.232** na -0.159** -0.036 0.524 na na -0.032 
  (0.077) (0.560) (0.953) (0.432) (0.038)  (0.022) (0.768) (0.407)   (0.745) 
Global terrorism   (-
1) 
 0.666*** 0.996*** 0.683*** 1.019*** 0.718***  1.102*** 0.880*** 0.555***   0.901*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)   (0.000) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
 -0.028 -0.030 0.209 0.021 -
0.278*** 
 0.007 0.068* 0.012   0.037 
  (0.707) (0.792) (0.282) (0.472) (0.000)  (0.758) (0.087) (0.889)   (0.309) 
Political Instability   -0.051 0.012 -0.041 0.042* -0.169  0.057*** 0.016 0.320   0.071** 
  (0.333) (0.939) (0.565) (0.078) (0.236)  (0.000) (0.709) (0.243)   (0.040) 
Weapons Imports   0.121** -0.0008 -0.084 -0.020 -0.012  0.069*** -0.017 0.054   -0.038 
  (0.030) (0.995) (0.302) (0.168) (0.943)  (0.008) (0.555) (0.655)   (0.259) 
Weapons Exports    -0.003 0.047*** 0.0008 -0.012 0.018  -0.003 0.009 -0.101   -0.020 
  (0.855) (0.006) (0.983) (0.361) (0.411)  (0.806) (0.426) (0.172)   (0.129) 
Displaced Persons     -0.089 -0.029 0.081 0.001 0.093  -0.079*** 0.024 -0.523   0.031 
  (0.164) (0.963) (0.534) (0.920) (0.319)  (0.000) (0.324) (0.355)   (0.485) 
Military Expenditure    -0.172 -0.092 0.050 -0.035 -0.031  -0.027 -0.015 -0.118   -0.032 
  (0.135) (0.384) (0.401) (0.341) (0.801)  (0.279) (0.631) (0.680)   (0.403) 
UNPKF   -0.039 -0.050 -0.125 0.012 0.054  -0.014 -0.009 -0.003   -0.0002 
  (0.385) (0.314) (0.312) (0.401) (0.377)  (0.412) (0.623) (0.965)   (0.991) 
              
AR(1)  (0.002) (0.138) (0.056) (0.005) (0.020)  (0.003) (0.000) (0.047)   (0.000) 
AR(2)  (0.080) (0.400) (0.470) (0.313) (0.835)  (0.614) (0.336) (0.733)   (0.115) 
Sargan OIR  (0.039) (0.095) (0.065) (0.412) (0.674)  (0.508) (0.166) (0.131)   (0.327) 
Hansen OIR  (0.251) (1.000) (0.979) (0.380) (0.994)  (0.698) (0.267) (0.999)   (0.371) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in 
levels 
             
H excluding group  (0.237) (0.613) (0.395) (0.852) (0.110)  (0.593) (0.693) (0.560)   (0.965) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.330) (1.000) (0.999) (0.170) (1.000)  (0.634) (0.140) (1.000)   (0.117) 
(b) IV (years, eq 
(diff)) H excluding 
group 
 (0.186) (1.000) (1.000) (0.228) (0.851)  (0.584) (0.387) (0.930)   (0.664) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.574) (0.980) (0.181) (0.861) (1.000)  (0.733) (0.161) (1.000)   (0.072) 
Fisher  130.04*** 66.89*** 199.05*** 1705*** 51.43***  732.96*** 45.67*** 51.65***   52.44*** 
Instruments  35 35 35 35 35  35 35 35   35 
Countries   48 18 20 44 23  50 87 20   163 
Observations   240 90 100 219 115  249 435 100   814 
              
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. Eng: 
English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law countries. Social: Socialists 
countries.  ECA: Europe & Central Asia. EAP: East Asia & the Pacific. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. SSA: sub-Saharan Africa. LA: Latin America. NA: 
North America. 
 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results  
This section provides some justifications for the findings observed in the preceding section. It 
is structured to address four main questions  which directly result from the reported findings, 
notably: (i) Why does persistence in terrorism decrease as income levels increase, (ii) Why is 
persistence in terrorism more apparent in Islam-oriented countries compared to Christian-
oriented countries, (iii) Why do Landlocked countries reflect higher levels of persistence in 
terrorism relative to coastal countries and (iv) Why is persistence in terrorism more in Latin 
American countries compared  to the MENA countries? 
 First, the fact that terrorism is more persistent in low income countries is logical 
because high income countries have financial and logistical resources with which to prevent 
and mitigate the effects of terrorism. It is in this vein that recent literature has focused on the 
role of foreign aid in modulating the effect of terrorism on development outcomes in 
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developing countries (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014). Such literature is motivated by the fact 
that, developed countries can more easily prevent terrorism and even when attacked, avoid 
negative macroeconomic externalities (Asongu & Ssozi, 2017).  
 Second, the fact that terrorism is more persistent in Islam-oriented countries is 
consistent with stylized facts because most terrorists are inspired by religiously-motivated 
political violence. This is consistent with a dominant strand of contemporary literature on the 
relationship between religion and terrorism (Ben-Dor & Pedahzur, 2003; Jackson, 2007; Ellis, 
2017). Third, the higher comparative persistence in landlocked countries may be traceable to 
the institutional cost associated with landlockedness which could entail political instability 
and violence. The narrative on the high institutional cost of landlockedness is consistent with 
the relevant literature (Arvis, 2007). 
 Fourth, the comparative regional importance of Latin America in sticky terrorism can 
be fundamentally traceable to the relative higher evidence of “access to weapons” and 
homicides in the region. It is important to note that the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) score 
consists of four main components: terrorism incidents, terrorism injuries, terrorism fatalities 
and terrorism-related property damage.   These factors are closely associated with violence 
and homicides which characterize most Latin American countries.    Consistent with Muggah 
and de Carvalho (2017), every 15 minutes, a young Latin American youth is murdered. The 
report by the authors maintains that Latin America is in the driver’s seat when it comes to 
homicides in the world because it has registered more than 2.5 million homicides since the 
year 2000. According to the authors, the continent is host to 23 of the 25 most murderous 
cities and 44 of the 50 most homicidal countries. Furthermore, as the global rate of homicide 
drops, the continent has instead been experiencing a rise in homicidal rate.  This perspective is 
worth substantiating with some stylized facts. (i) In 2035, the annual murder rate in the 
continent is projected to rise to 35/100 000 from the current rate of 22/100 000 and (ii) seven 
countries (Venezuela, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia and Brazil) in 
the continent make-up about 25% of murders in the world (Muggah & de Carvalho, 2017). 
 It is also important to note that while MENA countries are Islam-oriented and Latin 
American countries are Christian-oriented, Latin American countries can exhibit higher levels 
of persistence in terrorism for two main reasons: (i) Non-MENA countries among Islam-
oriented countries account for much of the persistence in the Islam-oriented fundamental 
characteristic and (ii) Latin American countries relative to MENA countries are more 
sensitive to factors in the conditioning information set. This latter explanation essentially 
builds on the fact that in the light of the theoretical underpinnings, conditional persistence is 
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contingent on the adopted elements in the conditioning information set. A brief comparative 
analysis shows that among these variables, “security officers & police” is significant in the 
Latin American sub-sample whereas it is no significant in the MENA sub-sample. 
 
5. Concluding implications and future research directions  
This study has investigated persistence of global terrorism in a panel of 163 countries for the 
period 2010 to 2015. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments. In 
order to increase room for policy implications, the dataset has been decomposed into 
fundamentals based on income levels, legal origins, religious domination, landlockedness and 
regional proximity. The following findings have been established. First, persistence in 
terrorism is a decreasing function of income levels because it consistently increases from high 
income (through upper middle income) to lower middle income countries. Second, compared 
to Christian-oriented countries, terrorism is more persistent in Islam-oriented nations. Third, 
landlocked countries also reflect a higher level of persistence relative to their coastal 
counterparts. Fourth, Latin American countries show higher degrees of persistence when 
compared with Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. Fifth, the main 
determinants of the underlying persistence are political instability and weapons import. 
Justifications for the established tendencies have been discussed.  In what follows, we provide 
some consequences and implications for public spending, foreign aid, foreign investment and 
tourism.  
 Accordingly, the established comparative evidences on the persistence of terrorism 
hold some implications for policy. We first discuss some consequences of terrorism on 
economic activity before providing corresponding implications. First, foreign direct 
investment location decisions are substantially contingent on the risks associated with the 
underlying investment. The GPI used in this study entails risks factors that can discourage 
foreign direct investment, for the most part. Accordingly, whereas terrorism can be an 
incentive for the “security and weaponry” industry, it is not the case for sectors such as the 
tourism industry that substantially involves the traffic of people. Second, tourists’ arrivals to a 
given destinations are very likely to be determined by human causalities as well as risks of 
potential causalities associated with   terrorism. In summary the consequences pertaining to 
tourism and foreign direct investment are consistent with the “wound culture theory” which 
maintains that high risk probability and probability/perception of murder affect a multitude of 
foreign interests in a country, inter alia: increased risks to public travel and investment and 
decreased opportunities for refreshments, dining and acquisition of souvenirs.  Addressing the 
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concerns would require more spending to address terrorism-related issues. Third, more public 
spending is needed to prevent and mitigate the underlying issues because, lost in productivity 
(and unproductivity) related to terrorism are not exclusively foreign-related. Panic from 
domestic investors could also push them to transfer their investments to more secured 
regions/countries. Fourth, given that developing countries are logically associated with less 
financial, technical and logistical resources with which to attenuate and prevent the 
consequences of terrorism, development assistance from developed countries can address 
some negative gaps in public spending. More efficient management of existing spending to 
prevent (instead of fighting terrorism) is recommended. Foreign aid is a valuable mechanism 
by which, inter alia: counterterrorism techniques can be learnt and applied; security and 
police officers can be trained and rendered more effective and; research on solutions to 
terrorism can be funded so that policy makers apply more measures that are robust to 
empirical validity.  It is important to note that in the disbursements of the suggested 
development assistance, priority should be given to fundamental characteristics associated 
with the highest levels of persistence in global terrorism index scores.      
 Future studies can improve the extant literature by focusing on country-specific 
studies in order to articulate country-specific policy implications. Country-specific cases are 
worthwhile because, for instance, the violent undertaking of drug criminals in Colombia may 
not be thoroughly elucidated by the same factors in African, the Middle East and European 
countries.  Hence, a corresponding caveat to this research is that future studies need to engage 
alternative control variables in the conditioning information set that are country-specific. 
Moreover, modeling the future of global terrorism in the light of current trends will 
complement the suggested policy implications for public spending and foreign aid.   
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
  
Variables  Definitions and sources of variables   
  
Global Terrorism Index 
(GTI) 
Logarithm (1+base) Global Terrorism Index overall score 
  
Security Officers & Police Number of internal security officers and police 
per 100,000 people UNODC; EIU estimates 
  
Political instability  Political instability 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
£  
Weapon imports  Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons 
as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers 
Database 
  
Weapon exports Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 
100,000 people 
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
  
Displaced people  Number of refugees and internally displaced people 
as a percentage of the population 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Mid-Year Trends; 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 
  
Military expenditure  Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
The Military Balance, IISS 
  
United Nations 
Peacekeeping Funding. 
Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions 
United Nations Committee on Contributions; IEP 
  
  
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. EIU: Economic Intelligence Unit. UNHCR: United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. IISS: The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies.  UN: United Nations. IEP: Institute for Economics and Peace.  
  
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics and Presentation of countries  
      
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Global Terrorism Index (GTI)(Ln) 0.835 0.763 0.000 2.397 977 
      
Security Officers & Police 2.728 0.911 1.081 5.000 978 
      
      
Political instability  2.545 1.030 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Weapon imports  1.489 0.868 1.000 5.000 978   
      
Weapon exports 1.342 0.932 1.000 5.000 978   
      
Displaced people  1.348 0.872 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Military expenditure  1.966 0.824 1.000 5.000 978 
      
United Nations Peacekeeping 
Funding. 
2.291 1.164 1.000 5.000 978 
      
      
Panel B: Presentation of countries 
Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d' Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; 
Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; 
Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; 
Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; 
Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New 
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Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; North Korea; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palestine; Panama; Papua New 
Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the Congo; Romania; Russia; 
Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; 
South Korea; South Sudan; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; 
Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; The Gambia; Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; 
Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
      
      
Standard dev: Standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.  
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix (uniform sample size:  977) 
         
S O & P Pol. Insta. W. Imports W. Exports D. People Military UNPKF GTI  
1.000 0.043 0.140 -0.011 0.036 0.215 0.0001 -0.063 S O & P 
 1.000 -0.238 -0.285 0.336 0.336 0.403 0.306 Pol.  Insta. 
  1.000 0.125 -0.058 0.237 -0.181 -0.042 W. Imports 
   1.000 -0.114 0.026 -0.211 0.104 W. Exports 
    1.000 0.292 0.120 0.340 D. People 
     1.000 -0.011 0.236 Military  
      1.000 0.027 UNPKF 
       1.000 GTI 
         
SO & P: Security Officers  & Police. Pol. Insta: Political Instability. W. Imports: Weapons Imports. W. Exports: Weapons 
Exports. D. People: Displaced People. Military: Military Expenditure. UNPKF: United Nations Peacekeeping Funding. GTI: 
Global Terrorism Index.  
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